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Exemplary Goods:  
Exemplars as Judgment Devices 
Erwin Dekker 
Abstract 
In this article the notion of exemplars is developed to study valuation 
processes. It argues that exemplary goods are an important ‘judgment device’ 
on markets of singular goods, which has so far been ignored in the literature. 
The article draws on Hannah Arendt’s theory of exemplars, as well as 
literature from the philosophy of science and psychology to construct the new 
concept. Exemplars are particular goods that become focal points in markets 
that facilitate the mutual coordination of consumers and producers. From 
these exemplars norms of quality emerge which are otherwise hard or 
impossible to explicate. These exemplars and the norms of quality which 
emerge from them help shape the expectations of both producers and 
consumers with regard to new goods that are introduced to the market. Two 
illustrative cases, on classic literature and hip-hop music, are presented to 
demonstrate the relevance of the concept.  
Key words: valuation; exemplars; economy of qualities; cultural economics; 
singular goods; classification 
We frequently reason from particular to particular, from one unique 
instance to another. Lebron James is an excellent basketball player, but 
not as good as Michael Jordan. The recent Woody Allen movie is nice, 
but not as good as Annie Hall or Manhattan. Wealth inequality is 
almost as high as it was during the Belle Époque. This type of 
reasoning is important not just in everyday speech; but when we 
analyze business models the use of exemplary case studies is a 
recurring theme. We want our organization to run like the best out 
there. ‘Harvard on the Maas’ is the current aspiration here in 
Rotterdam. In science too, particular exemplars are important as an 
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inspiration and guide to what good science is. Does an economist want 
to be an economist like Adam Smith or like Paul Samuelson? a 
sociologist like Max Weber or Talcott Parsons? This paper argues that 
exemplars are an important judgment device in markets for singular 
goods (Karpik 2010). These exemplary goods are not average 
examples, or representative of the wide variation out there, but they 
are able to capture the typical, the exemplary. 
Market coordination is traditionally believed to occur via changes 
in prices and quantity. In a set of articles Hayek (1937, 1945) 
demonstrated that the power of markets is to coordinate a variety of 
individual economic plans via adjustments to market prices and 
quantities, a process which lies at the heart of supply-and-demand 
dynamics. Central to this process is the use of knowledge that is 
dispersed throughout society. Hayek, and economists after him, 
however, has largely neglected how quality coordination can occur. 
This project has recently been taken up by Lucien Karpik (2010). He 
argues that in markets for singular goods—goods which are all 
different from one another such as movies, medical services or dining 
experiences—such coordination via price and quantity is of limited 
importance. According to him quality coordination is, in line with 
Hayek, of great importance in such markets (see also White 2002). To 
study quality coordination Karpik develops four economic 
coordination regimes, which are institutional arrangements that 
structure the dispersion of knowledge in different markets for singular 
goods (Karpik 2010). Within these economic coordination regimes, he 
identifies different judgment devices, which act as signposts for 
consumers. Karpik broadly uses this notion to include advertising, 
reviews, rankings and networks. Sometimes these judgment devices are 
developed by producers or consumers, but often mediators are 
important actors in this coordination process. Without wishing to 
contest the importance of Karpik’s judgment devices, we focus here on 
a different type of judgment device, the exemplary good. The 
exemplary good is (one of the) currently prominent goods, which acts 
as reference or focal point for the identification of the relevant 
qualities of a particular type of good for consumers. 
To develop the concept of exemplars, and exemplary goods, we will 
build on Hannah Arendt’s theory of judgment. Her theory is, like 
Karpik’s, concerned with the tension between the general and the 
particular. Karpik calls these goods singularities, to emphasize their 
uniqueness, but he recognizes that to be understood they have to be 
related and commensurated to existing goods. Arendt argues that the 
exemplary mode of reasoning is of special importance when we judge 
the particular in light of the general, but without wanting to give up 
the uniqueness of the particular. This is typically the case for cultural 
goods as has been demonstrated in the various contributions of 
Nathalie Heinich (2005; for an English introduction see Danko 2008). 
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So while products are unique, they are in fact compared, contrasted 
and related to these exemplars (“if you liked the West Wing TV-series, 
you will love the House of Cards”). This can lead to somewhat 
paradoxical claims, as we will see in one of the illustrative case studies 
of novels below (“a genius as singular as Robert Walser, Bruno Schulz 
or Joseph Roth”). We will demonstrate that the goods bought and sold 
in markets for singular goods often oscillate between the two poles of 
‘commodification and commensuration’ on the one hand and 
‘singularization’ on the other (Kopytoff 1986). 
The second aspect of exemplars that we will highlight is the plural 
notion of quality they enable. In any category we will find multiple 
exemplars, which represent different particular instances of the good 
or the desirable. The traditional economic manner of studying the 
prices (and hence the valuation) of differentiated goods is to study the 
shadow prices of their individual characteristics. But, so argues Karpik, 
the characteristics of say a Bordeaux wine cannot be split up, its 
qualities are interdependent (Karpik 2010: 24–26). Splitting up a 
product into separable characteristics might work for airbags added to 
a car, but matters are not as simple for an added flavor element to a 
wine or an additional brushstroke to a painting. The fact that such 
goods can be good in multiple, interdependent dimensions and that 
these are interdependent is called multidimensionality by Karpik. But, 
while he recognizes that this leads to a wide variety of combinations 
that can be valued, his theory does not really allow us to deal with this 
plural notion of quality. The judgment devices which Karpik refers to, 
such as rankings or charts, ultimately presume a single notion of 
quality. This is different for the labels, appellations and signifiers that 
Karpik associates with the authenticity regime, but even they refer to 
somewhat broader categories with associated standards of quality. 
Exemplars on the other hand provide a way of maintaining a variety 
of quality “standards,” through particular combinations of qualities, 
that more general judgment devices have trouble dealing with. 
Finally exemplars are used across different economic coordination 
regimes. They serve an important role as reference points in graded 
category structures. The gradedness of categories means that some 
examples of a species or kind are a better example of that category 
than others. A robin is a more typical bird than the penguin or the 
ostrich. Exemplary goods are typically identified, precisely because 
they are a very good (or the best) fit. They embody a combination of 
qualities, which might be hard to make explicit, but which can be 
discovered through the interpretation of these exemplary goods. 
Arendt’s theory, as well as other contributions to thinking about 
exemplars, will be discussed in Section 1. In Section 2 we will develop 
the notion of exemplars as a judgment device. Sections 3 and 4 contain 
illustrative case studies, or vignettes, which demonstrate the empirical 
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usefulness of this concept. Section 5 concludes with suggestions for 
further work in this direction. 
Exemplary Validi ty 
Although exemplars have a long tradition, for example in the 
Christian tradition of portraying the life of saints as exemplary lives, 
they have received little systematic attention in the study of valuation. 
The exception is Hannah Arendt’s theory of judgment, in which 
exemplars occupy a prominent place. Arendt’s magnum opus was to be 
a two-volume work on the life of the mind. The theory of judging—in 
which she develops the theory of exemplary validity—followed the 
two other aspects of the life of the mind: thinking and willing. Judging 
would come closest to the vita activa, of which Arendt originally 
believed judging to be a part. Arendt (1982: 76) argues in the lectures 
on Kant’s philosophy that the specific difficulty of judging is: “the 
faculty of thinking the particular.” Pure thinking for Arendt is thinking 
in the general, it is thinking in rules, laws and regularities. Judging on 
the other hand is to consider the particular in light of the universal, 
but to keep in mind the uniqueness of the particular. This difficulty is 
even greater when, and here she quotes Kant: “the particular be given 
for which the general has to be found.” So she argues that if we are 
dealing with unique occurrences, such as in history, we have to 
consider those occurrences in light of the general, but keeping in mind 
that individual occurrences can never be completely subsumed under 
any generality. There are also a great many cases for which a generality 
has not yet been found, and in that case we can, by definition, only 
compare certain particulars to other particulars. 
The type of reasoning called for in such cases is different from two 
well-known other modes of reasoning. The deductive mode of 
reasoning starts from a universal law and then deduces what is true of 
the particular as in the time tested: All men are mortal, Socrates is a 
man, and therefore Socrates is mortal. The other type of reasoning, 
prominent in the social sciences, is inferential reasoning which 
observes many particulars to arrive at “empirical regularities” which at 
some stage would preferably be formulated as universal laws. 
Inferential reasoning has been perfected with the development of 
statistics over the past century and a half or so and deductive 
reasoning has been perfected with the help of axiomatic mathematical 
reasoning, but exemplary reasoning is usually discarded as “mere 
anecdotal evidence.” 
The exemplary mode of reasoning is explained by Hannah Arendt 
by way of a table. One could have in mind a list of characteristics to 
which every table must conform to qualify as a table. If we then meet 
an object we can determine whether it fits the requirements: a flat top 
surface placed on a number of legs, etc. (deduction). Second, one could 
compare this particular object to the many tables one has seen in one’s 
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life, and by inferential judgment decide whether this too is a table. Or, 
Arendt (1982: 77) argues, one could “think of some table as the 
example of how tables actually should be: the exemplary table. This 
exemplar is and remains a particular that in its very particularity 
reveals the generality that otherwise could not be defined.” 
Exemplary reasoning allows us to maintain both the singularity and 
the generality. Through exemplars we get to know the qualities or the 
characteristics that exemplify what it means to be beautiful or moving. 
Or as Arendt (1982) puts it: “The example is the particular that 
contains in itself, or is supposed to contain, a concept or general rule 
[...] If we say of somebody that he is good, we have in the back of our 
minds the example of Saint Francis or Jesus of Nazareth.” She could 
have added that it is frequently very difficult to make explicit what the 
general rule is that is “contained” in these exemplars. 
Arendt adds another important insight to her theory. Exemplars, she 
argues, can only take on this meaning of exemplifying the good or the 
courageous when they are widely known within a particular 
community. This is in fact what she argues about Napoleon Bonaparte: 
In the context of French history I can talk about Napoleon Bonaparte as a 
particular man; but the moment I speak about Bonapartism I have made an 
example of him. The validity of this example will be restricted to those who 
possess the particular experience of Napoleon, either as his contemporaries or as 
the heirs to this particular historical tradition. (Arendt 1982: 84–85) 
The historical episode of the rule of Napoleon Bonaparte thus comes 
to stand for something more general, which nonetheless is hard to 
describe or define in the abstract or the general. Arendt argues that 
most concepts in the historical and political sciences—should we add 
the social?—have an exemplary nature, they cannot be exhaustively 
defined or delimited, but they derive their meaning from specific 
examples, or exemplars. 
At this point of her theory Arendt comes close to Weber’s theory of 
ideal types. By shifting from Napoleon Bonaparte as a particular ruler 
to Bonapartism as an idealized type of rule, Arendt, in, Weber’s 
language, accentuates some typical features. As Weber argues: “we 
construct the concept ‘city economy’ not as an average of the economic 
structures actually existing in all the cities observed but as an ideal-
type” (Weber 1904 [1949]: 90). By doing so we create an “ideal” or a 
“mental image,” that is not actually observed. That is not, however, 
how we will use the notion of exemplar in this article; for us it remains 
an actual and particular instance—although the act of interpretation of 
this instance will highlight certain features of that particular instance. 
The emphasis on the particular is also what we find in the 
psychological literature on exemplars. In psychology the notion of 
exemplars has been used to study the cognitive formation of categories 
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and thus links up directly with Arendt’s emphasis on learning about 
characteristics of concepts (Mervis and Rosch 1981). The original 
contributions on this subject emphasize the heuristic nature of 
exemplars, which minimize cognitive effort and maximize cognitive 
content (Rosch 1978). 
One of the most robust and important findings in this literature is 
that categories have a graded structure (Barsalou 1985).  That means 1
that not every member is an equally good example of a particular 
category. Some instances or examples are considered typical or 
exemplary of a category. A typical example of this finding is that that 
“robins” are consistently considered to be exemplary birds, but 
penguins far less so. Such exemplars are learned faster by children, and 
play a crucial role in category formation (Lynch et al. 2000). Typically 
it is believed that exemplars possess this function because they 
represent a “central tendency.” But more recent studies have 
distinguished between a typical (central) instance and an exemplary 
instance. These sometimes overlap, but particularly when a notion of 
goodness is involved the exemplary tends to be close to some ideal, 
and thus far from the typical (Burnett et al. 2005). This finding will be 
of particular relevance in our consideration of the qualities of cultural 
goods in the next section. These studies further demonstrate that 
exemplars are more likely to be close to some ideal when expertise is 
involved, another issue of particular relevance for cultural goods. 
The emphasis on learning and tacit knowledge in Arendt’s account 
of exemplars is also present in Thomas Kuhn’s writings on the subject. 
Kuhn discusses exemplars as having great importance in learning what 
a paradigm consists of. He argues that exemplars are of crucial 
importance for understanding in science, and he suggests that through 
the use of exemplars we learn knowledge that can frequently not be 
reduced to explicit general rules (Kuhn 1970: 194). While Arendt’s 
analysis restricts itself to the human sciences, Kuhn makes clear that 
exemplars are equally important for understanding in the natural 
sciences. 
Exemplars as Judgment Devices 
The importance of classification and qualification have long been 
recognized by economic sociologists as being central to the valuation 
of goods (DiMaggio 1987). Michel Callon and colleagues (Callon et al. 
2002: 199) in their work on “the economy of qualities” argue, for 
example, that: “All quality is obtained at the end of a process of 
qualification, and all qualification aims to establish a constellation of 
characteristics which are attached to the product and transform it 
temporarily into a tradable good in the market.” But sometimes such 
 Some of the early authors on exemplars noted the connection with family 1
resemblances as described by Wittgenstein (Rosch and Mervis 1975).
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qualification is difficult, or the categories are graded in complex ways; 
in such cases qualification is ambiguous or only a first step in the 
evaluation of quality. In such cases other judgment devices are likely to 
emerge (Musselin and Paradeise 2005: 93). 
Particularly in markets for singular goods, that is, goods which are 
all unique in non-trivial ways, we expect a variety of judgment devices 
to emerge, to facilitate the process of valuation. Such markets are 
characterized by an “infinite variety” of goods, such as books or 
movies (Caves 2000: 6). For these types of goods what constitutes 
quality is almost without exception contested. Some goods are 
particulars for which the general still has to be found, to use the 
Kantian expression. Even if generalities are found, e.g. when we believe 
that character development is important for novels, how much or what 
type of character development we would like to see is contested. More 
importantly still, efforts to explicate what would count and what 
would not count as character development are bound to fail due to the 
open-ended character of such concepts. Third, as Karpik notes, the 
qualities of these goods are interdependent so great character 
development in an otherwise failed novel will be of little value. This is 
where exemplars are important; they provide particular instances in 
which we find the quality of character development, in combination 
with other qualities, “in action” or “exemplified.”  
The notion of judgment devices emphasizes processes of 
coordination. Producers and consumers do not naturally exchange or 
find each other. Markets for singular goods, as well as many more 
standardized goods, are full of mediators, middlemen, judgment 
devices and norms which facilitate this exchange. Exemplary goods are 
one example of this mediating process. Traditional economic models 
pay little attention to this process of coordination and mediation. But 
in the Austrian tradition, of which Hayek is the most important 
exponent, processes of coordination are always center stage and the 
relevant knowledge has to be discovered. This is true for prices, which 
allow market calculation to take place, but also true for judgment, or 
what Hayek calls the knowledge of time and place (Hayek 1945). This 
means that for him an essential part of the competitive market process 
is the discovery and use of knowledge: “Competition is essentially a 
process of the formation of opinion: by spreading information, it 
creates that unity and coherence of the economic system which we 
presuppose when we think of it as one market” (Hayek 1948: 106). It 
is at this point that the economic sociology of Callon and Karpik 
meets the economics of Hayek. 
Existing exemplary goods allow us to interpret new goods that 
come on the market. It is in this sense that exemplars help coordinate 
markets. Meaning is a category frequently neglected—or should we 
say taken for granted—in economic theorizing, but exemplars and 
their accepted interpretations are guides for interpretation of new 
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goods. In the cultural economic as well as the broader economic 
literature the concepts of experience and credence goods have been 
developed, both of which stress the uncertainty associated with the 
consumption of differentiated goods. Traditional solutions to this issue 
stress the role of information, but not that of interpretation (and 
valuation). A recent paper by Earl and Potts (2013), however, goes 
some way to exploring the notion of consumption capabilities and the 
capacity to appreciate “newness” (see also Hutter 2011). Earl and 
Potts note the importance of previous points of reference, and the 
relation between new products and the existing set of consumption 
capabilities (which are an outcome of previous consumption). They, 
however, accept the information and pattern recognition framework 
that lies at the basis of modern microeconomic theory instead of 
emphasizing the importance of interpretation as emphasized in 
Arendt’s theory of exemplary validity and Karpik’s theory of judgment 
devices. 
Arendt and Karpik both recognize that new goods (or situations) 
need be interpreted in relation to other particulars. There are no 
generally applicable rules and the (e)valuation of a new unique 
product is thus always an interpretive act, it requires judgment. In 
particular it requires a judgment about the commonalities it shares 
with other unique products, and thus also about what is a relevant 
comparison in the first place. We might easily agree that the Harry 
Potter novels are an outstanding success on the market, but to guide 
future action on markets they have to be interpreted. What makes 
these books successful? Which of their qualities are valued by 
consumers? Or in other words what is exemplary about these books? 
Sometimes this judgment is rather passive on the side of the 
consumer, because as Barbara H. Smith (1983) observes in a different 
context: “Not only are the objects we encounter always to some extent 
pre-interpreted and pre-classified for us by our particular cultures and 
languages, but also pre-evaluated, bearing the marks and signs of their 
prior valuings and evaluations by our fellow creatures.” How she 
continues is just as illuminating:  
Indeed, pre-classification is itself a form of pre-evaluation, for the labels or 
category names under which we encounter objects not only, as was suggested 
earlier, foreground certain of their possible functions but also operate as signs?in 
effect, as culturally certified endorsements?of their more or less effective 
performance of those functions. (Smith 1983: 23) 
In terms of exemplars, producers might guide the consumer with 
phrases like “from the makers of.” Those pre-classifications, labels, 
category names and valuations are part of what Karpik calls judgment 
devices. 
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In many other situations the judgment process will be more active, a 
point recognized by Karpik, in his distinction between four economic 
coordination regimes. In some regimes such as the mega-regime, most 
of the coordination is done before the product comes to market, and 
the agency of the consumer is limited. In other regimes there is more 
scope, or sometimes need, for interpretation by the consumer. The 
example of wines that Karpik (2010) studies in detail would be one 
example, where there is a combination of pre-classification and space 
for independent judgment by the consumer. Both Smith and Karpik, 
like many other scholars, are however primarily interested in the 
classification and qualification systems that exist one level above goods 
(see also Beckert and Musselin 2013). They are less attentive to the 
relations between goods, from one particular to the next. 
It is even inherent in the definition of judgment devices that they are 
“tools to differentiate the quality of products” (Beckert 2012: 122). So 
strictly speaking one might argue exemplars cannot be such a “device” 
at all. But, if we think of particular categories, we soon realize that 
they are frequently defined by some exemplary good within that 
category. Think of recent products such as the tablet, or the 
smartphone, which have come to be defined by exemplary models. Or 
of categories which still bear the name of the first exemplary good. 
More importantly, we typically find that a shared intersubjective 
interpretation of exemplars will emerge, and as such they become 
something more general than just a particular good. Exemplars are 
literally a judgment device, in the sense that drafts, prototypes or other 
ideas for final products within design processes will typically be judged 
against current exemplary products. They also help shape expectations 
of consumers and suppliers alike, about what to expect in new 
products or what the chances of success for a new product are. 
Harrison White (2002: 79) describes what producers strive for: “each 
maneuvers to become sufficiently akin to other actors to become 
recognizable as their peer.” But producers, as White points out, want to 
retain their individuality at the same time; the tension is very similar to 
that discussed above between maintaining individuality while being 
similar enough to be understood and recognized. That is why White 
talks about markets as networks. Within these networks exemplars can 
be thought of as the focal points. 
In modern microeconomic theory we can find quite a few 
approaches in which the importance of such “focal points,” industry 
standards, or dominant designs are discussed. One can think of 
exemplars as providing guidance in this world of infinite variety. The 
notion of focal points was developed within game theory, especially in 
the work on strategic interaction by Schelling (1960). Sugden (1995), 
who expands those ideas, suggests that focal points are helpful to 
individuals who seek to coordinate their behavior. They will rely on 
particular points of coordination which are “prominent” or “salient.” 
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But as Sugden acknowledges it is hard to incorporate labels or 
examples into game theory, which treats all strategies as formally 
identical (only distinguished by numbers such as strategy 1, 2, etc.). 
That is different for the examples that Schelling originally provided, 
such as the coordination problem of where to meet if you have agreed 
to meet in New York but have not agreed a specific place. That 
problem is a cultural coordination problem, whose answer depends on 
cultural conventions (at the station? in front of the town hall? in the 
main street?). Such solutions depend on what Schelling (1960: 57–70) 
calls a “degree of prominence or conspicuousness” or later the 
“obvious.” Exemplars which gain prominence are precisely such 
prominent or obvious reference points. 
We face a similar problem to that of coordinating on a meeting 
point, when we face the infinite variety of say novels or movies. It is 
therefore only to be expected that focal points emerge. Such focal 
points exemplify what a genre or subgenre is and they provide a 
shared starting point for conversations, interpretations and valuations 
of a genre (“if you want to see a science-fiction movie you should start 
with say ET, or 2001: A Space Odyssey or Star Wars”). More recently 
French economic sociologists who call their approach “economics of 
convention” have started to analyze how certain standards or 
conventions come to be established within markets or organizations. 
As explained by Levy (2002), in contrast to game theorists they do 
engage in the interpretation of conventions as they emerge within 
existing markets, and how such conventions shape reciprocal 
expectations about the behavior of others (see also Eymard-Duvernay 
et al. 2005). One of the central questions in this approach is how such 
conventions emerge and how they remain in place. One would expect 
that particular early examples of a good, early exemplars, help shape 
such conventions. 
A final field in which exemplars have received attention is on the 
border between marketing and economics. Marketing scholars as well 
as economic sociologists have pointed to the importance of 
classifications and qualifications of goods. Some scholars have pointed 
to the importance of exemplars in the formation of new market 
categories (Rosa et al. 1999; Navis and Glynn 2010; Jones et al. 2012). 
Others have demonstrated that products or organizations that are 
difficult to classify or compare to an exemplar suffer an “illegitimacy 
discount,” resulting in a lower valuation of the good (Zuckerman 
1999; Carroll and Swaminathan 2000). 
We will illustrate the role of exemplars as a judgment device with 
two cases-studies that are presented here not primarily for their 
inherent interest, but rather as illustrations of the empirical usefulness 
of the concept of exemplary goods. They demonstrate how we can 
operationalize the concept, and how it can help us understand the way 
in which exemplars become focal points, and shape the mutual 
coordination process between consumers and producers. 
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Marketing Forgotten Classics 
The magazine New York Review of Books (NYRB) has been 
publishing a series of books since 1999 under the label “NYRB 
Classics.” The series, just as the magazine, is aimed at a serious 
readership, individuals who read widely and frequently, who know 
their way around the established literary canon, and who are 
interested in exploring world literature. The series primarily consists of 
books that have not previously been translated into English. The 
majority of the books was originally published in the twentieth century 
(85 percent) with another 10 percent of them from the nineteenth 
century (NYRB website). We have analyzed the extent to which 
exemplars are used in the descriptions of these 344 books provided on 
the website of the “NYRB Classics.” This material consists of two 
parts: the description of the book as provided by the editor(s) of the 
classics series; and as a collection of typically three to five excerpts 
from reviews (by external parties) of the books. 
One might argue that this material is far from neutral since it is 
meant to promote the book rather than to evaluate it. That is 
absolutely true. The material is not neutral, and the review excerpts are 
undoubtedly picked to make the book look good. However, this is not 
a problem for the purpose at hand, since the very reason for using 
exemplars is to coordinate the expectations of both the producers (the 
publisher in this case) and the consumers. The description provided on 
the website is a mixture of information about the book and praise for 
the book (a mix of the descriptive and the evaluative; see Kjellberg et 
al. (2013)). It is not unusual for publishers to request authors (or their 
agents) to position their manuscript in relation to other works on the 
market. As such the material is well suited to get insight into what sort 
of qualities are praised when considering this type of book. 
The books in this series range in genre from novels to short stories 
and from science and history to essays and criticism. One would 
expect different exemplars to emerge within these genres, so we will 
restrict ourselves here primarily to novels and short stories, categories 
for which we have sufficient observations. An exemplar is counted as 
such when a book or an author in the NYRB series is compared or 
contrasted to a book or an author being described, or when he or she 
is mentioned as a literary heir to that author (for examples see below). 
What has not been included are famous reviewers (frequently 
themselves authors) who recommend the book and are included in the 
description (for example “Thomas Mann loved these stories”). 
The first thing we notice is the enormous variety of exemplars used 
in the total population of 344 books. No less than 339 exemplary 
authors or their works are mentioned to compare and contrast these 
books (out of these 108 are mentioned in at least two separate book 
descriptions). Aside from the comparison to other author’s work we 
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find references to works by the same author in 34 descriptions (10 
percent). Another 44 descriptions (13 percent) contain references to 
the work of non-literary artists, ranging from Disney to Steven 
Spielberg, from Edward Hopper to Paul Klee, and from Beethoven to 
Miles Davis. 
There are, however, also clear focal points, points of reference that 
are invoked more frequently than others. In Table 1 we have collected 
the authors that were mentioned at least five times in unique 
descriptions of books published in the series. It was necessary to 
exclude references to an author’s own oeuvre, because some authors 
were published frequently in the NYRB Classics, notably Kingsley 
Amis, Georges Simenon and Patrick Leigh Fermor which would skew 
the results. Henry James is clearly the exemplary author. He is 
mentioned in 6.1 percent of the descriptions of novels and collections 
of short stories published in the series. Table 1 shows the results for the 
entire population of NYRB Classics as well as a more restricted 
population of novels and short stories only. The results show clearly 
that the great majority of references (90 percent) to these authors is 
made in the description of novels and short stories (the genres in which 
these authors, with the exception of Shakespeare, excelled).   
                      
Table 1: Most mentioned authors in descriptions of separate books  
Note: The table lists the number of “mentions” and the percentages of descriptions 
in which they are mentioned. Source: author’s own calculation 
All books Novels and shorts only
Henry James 16 5 % 15 6 %
Leo Tolstoy 11 3 % 8 3 %
Charles Dickens 10 3 % 9 4 %
Fyodor Dostoyevsky 9 3 % 8 3 %
Anton Chekhov 8 2 % 8 3 %
Franz Kafka 8 2 % 8 3 %
Thomas Mann 8 2 % 7 3 %
Vladimir Nabokov 8 2 % 8 3 %
Patricia Highsmith 7 2 % 7 3 %
James Joyce 7 2 % 7 3 %
Gabriel Garcia Marquez 6 2 % 6 3 %
Jane Austen 5 2 % 4 2 %
Samuel Beckett 5 2 % 5 2 %
Jorge Luis Borges 5 2 % 5 2 %
Edgar Allan Poe 5 2 % 5 2 %
Marcel Proust 5 2 % 3 1 %
William Shakespeare 5 2 % 4 2 %
Alexander Solzhenitsyn 5 2 % 4 2 %
Mark Twain 5 2 % 3 1 %
Evelyn Waugh 5 2 % 5 2 %
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From these basic findings we can start to ask more sophisticated 
questions. What are the determinants of the invocation of the 
exemplar? Are exemplars used when the cultural distance is large, or 
when it is smaller? Are female exemplars more frequently invoked for 
books by female authors? Our purpose here is merely to demonstrate 
the general importance of exemplars, but it should be clear that these 
illustrative results could easily be expanded. 
One could also analyze the way in which these exemplars are used, 
which would lead to a more qualitative analysis. Do reviewers use 
exemplars to praise particular qualities, or do they instead compare 
books as a whole? Are exemplars primarily used to contrast or to 
compare? And what are the qualities which are associated with 
particular exemplars? Are there negative exemplars? 
We will undertake a qualitative analysis in ection 4, but we will 
demonstrate here some of the ways in which these exemplars are used. 
As an example we will take the references to the work of Dostoyevski 
(eight in total). They are: “[Carpenter] surpasses even Gorki and 
Dostoyevski in depicting the despair”; “A Dostoyevskian tale of crime 
punishment, and the pursuit of ever-elusive redemption”; “Balzac’s 
many literary inheritors from Dostoyevsky and Henry James to Marcel 
Proust”; “A handful of authors have portrayed the human condition of 
prison life with the indelible stamp of authenticity Dostoyevsky, 
Solzhenitsyn and Genet are among them”; “No one has written so well 
on prison life, since Dostoyevsky”; “Bernanos is, like Dostoyevsky, 
something of a sensualist of the soul”; “a sort of distaff Notes from the 
Underground”; “a lacerating exposition of the logic of identity that 
looks backward to Dostoyevsky, forward to Simenon.” The final 
reference only comes across if we quote it more extensively: 
These stories [by Krzhizhanovsky] represent strong entries in two different 
traditions of Russian literature: firstly, the unhinged, feverishly experimental 
universe […] secondly, the grand woe of Dostoyevsky, in which is expressed the 
physic trauma of a frozen country so frequently torn asunder by ideology. 
These references show that Dostoyevsky is not just referred to, but his 
work is actively engaged with by the descriptions and reviews. They 
highlight different qualities of his work: the authenticity, the depiction 
of prison life, the search for redemption, the exploration of identity 
and his analysis of ideology. In the final quote, the work of 
Dostoyevsky is referred to as something more general, like a tradition; 
it then becomes more than a particular. 
To evaluate the quality of a book the reviewers and the description 
draw on an enormous register of qualities from a long-standing 
(western) tradition. The results in this small study are undoubtedly 
influenced by the vastness of the literary landscape and the fact that 
these descriptions are targeted at an insider audience. But there is no 
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inherent reason to expect that expert-consumers in other fields are not 
able to handle such a multifaceted notion of quality as well. 
The tension between commensurability and incommensurability, or 
commonalities and singularization, is repeatedly evident. Take for 
example the following two references. In the description of Gyula 
Krúdy’s Sunflower the author is described as “a genius as singular as 
Robert Walser, Bruno Schulz or Joseph Roth,” while J. G. Farrell’s 
novel The Siege of Krishnapur is described in one of the review 
excerpts as “a masterpiece as unclassifiable as Guiseppe Lampedusa’s 
novel ‘The Leopard’ or Penelope Fitzgerald’s novel ‘The Blue Flower.’” 
The singularity of these novels becomes a quality in and of itself it 
seems, and to emphasize this singularity, ironically, they are made 
commensurable to other highly original novels. Another striking 
example is to be found in the description of the later-to-be bestseller 
Stoner by John Williams which the review excerpt describes as: “an 
anti-Gatsby.” Here the comparison is made to do two things at once; 
first contrast the allure of Fitzgerald’s classic to the restraint of Stoner 
and second put the two books in the same league. 
Exemplars are clearly used, by the editors of this series, to shape the 
expectations of potential consumers. They provide an accessible (at 
least for expert-consumers) interpretation of the qualities of the new 
good that is introduced to the market. The exemplars are reference 
points, and the new goods are positioned in relation to these focal 
points, and so the quality uncertainty associated with experience goods 
is reduced. This uncertainty is particularly present if there is no 
repeated consumption of the good as is the case in markets for 
singularities (although it is of course possible to read a novel multiple 
times). 
What is less clear from this brief case study is the extent to which 
these “classics” are selected by the publisher for their relation to goods 
that are better known by their readership. It is not unimaginable that 
the selection process involves the positioning of these forgotten books 
in relation to better known exemplars and that the evaluation of them 
by the editors is based on their relation to these exemplars. This would 
be further evidence of the role of exemplars in the quality coordination 
process. 
The Making of a Classic Rap Album: I l lmatic  
In this section we will focus on an argument put forward about what 
constitutes a classic hip-hop album. The debate about what makes a 
hip-hop album a classic flared up after the release of the widely 
acclaimed release of good kid, m.A.A.d. city by Kendrick Lamar. The 
album, to name but one of its many accolades, was voted best album 
of the year 2012 on the prestigious Pitchfork music website. Within 
the debate over the classic status of Lamar’s new album a particularly 
cogent analysis was put forward by rap critic Andrew Nosnitsky 
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(2012). He sums up his argument as follows: “When many people call 
good kid, m.A.A.d. city a classic, part of what they are unconsciously 
measuring is its Illmatic-ness.” 
Illmatic is the career-defining album of hip-hop artist Nas from 
1994. The album is said to capture the sound of the gritty New York 
streets of the early 1990s with Nas’s vivid metaphors and introspective 
lyrics over dark beats provided by some of the best hip-hop producers 
of the time. Illmatic has a playtime of just under 40 minutes and 
contains just ten songs—or nine if we exclude the intro—and is 
frequently praised for its cohesiveness. As Nosnitsky (2012) argues in 
his essay: “Nas does a few specific things almost perfectly on the 
record, while selectively sidestepping a lot of the other things that 
great rap songs and albums can do and have done.” In other words 
Nosnitsky argues that Illmatic is in some ways an untypical hip-hop 
album. 
Hip-hop, a genre that emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
was initially primarily party music. The early gatherings were street 
parties with electricity illegally tapped from the streetlights. The DJ 
was the main attraction, and the MC (who would later become the 
rapper) was secondary. Initially these DJs relied on specific parts of 
disco records (the breaks) but later also released their own songs. This 
meant that singles were much more important than albums. As 
Nosnitsky points out in his analysis, in the early 1980s when hip-hop 
came to the fore it was completely dominated by singles, and many of 
the major artists from that period never even released an album. That 
slowly changed during the 1980s when record labels were in search of 
saleable products and the message in the music became more 
important. When artists such as Run-DMC, Public Enemy and Boogie 
Down Productions started to release albums they consisted of the 
major singles (which had frequently been released before) while the 
rest of the album was filled with DJ songs or mega-mixes. That 
changed around 1990 when artists and groups consciously set about 
making cohesive albums that would live longer than the singles which 
typically disappeared after the radio stations stopped playing them. 
Groups such as De La Soul and A Tribe Called Quest created 
albums that were clearly intended to be consumed as wholes, and that 
sometimes lacked more radio-friendly tracks that could be used as 
singles. As Nosnitsky (2012) argues about this trend: 
This was apparent by the release of Nas' 1994 debut, Illmatic. If it wasn't the first 
classic-by-design, it was certainly the most visible (and probably still is). Nas was 
a highly-buzzed-about serious young rapper making a very serious rap album 
about his very serious world. 
The standard by which hip-hop was valued started to change. The 
exemplary act was no longer the combination of a DJ with his MCs, 
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but it was increasingly the individual rapper with a team of music 
producers behind him. This was visible in discussions about crucial 
terms such as the MC, the essence of which had been to “move the 
crowd” (emphasizing the live element) as one artist had famously 
proclaimed in the 1980s. In the 1990s the MC became the rapper, 
whose most important asset were his increasingly complex lyrics and 
flow—the term used to capture how rhythmically the rhymes are 
delivered—as recorded on record. Nas might be said to be the pinnacle 
of this development. The magazine The Source, which at the time of 
the release of Illmatic was the most respected magazine covering hip-
hop: “called it ‘one of the best hip-hop albums I have ever heard’ and 
gave it the magazine's perfect five mic rating.” That same issue of the 
magazine contained an article which detailed the story of “the building 
a hip-hop classic” and which labelled Nas the second coming. During 
this process Illmatic slowly became the exemplar by which future hip-
hop albums came to be measured, or as Nosnitsky (2012) puts it: “The 
legend of Illmatic has snowballed in the years since, to where it's no 
longer just a rap classic, but the rap classic by which all rap classics are 
measured.” 
Illmatic became the exemplary hip-hop album. Seasoned hip-hop 
critic Elliot Wilson (2012) also appraises the Kendrick Lamar album 
by qualities associated with Illmatic: “it is a full body of work, not just 
a bunch of records thrown together.” And there are similarities 
between the Kendrick Lamar album and Nas’s classic album as 
Nosnitsky acknowledges: “heavy imagery, coming-of-age 
introspection.” But Illmatic is a narrow exemplar to measure classic 
status by he argues: “Illmatic is almost never fun or funny, and it's 
generally more personal than political. It produced no major hits and 
today its songs don't exactly work as party starters in any room where 
listeners aren't already familiar with them.” It is not that humor, 
politics and party music are not part of hip-hop—in fact the latter two 
more or less defined the genre during the 1980s—but that to be 
considered a classic an album should not contain too much of either. 
The argument by Nosnitsky is thus two-sided. On the one hand he 
shows what the exemplary validity of Illmatic has done for the 
subsequent reception of hip-hop albums, for how they are interpreted 
and valued. On the other hand he hopes to challenge this rather 
narrow standard by offering alternative exemplars: the party-oriented 
music of the early 1980s, the political music of the late eighties and the 
less cohesive and more ephemeral mix-tapes which came to dominate 
much of hip-hop in the internet-age. 
Nosnitsky takes his argument one step further, beyond the reception 
of Kendrick Lamar’s album. He extends his analysis to show how 
Illmatic has also served as the exemplary model of how to make a 
great hip-hop album. He argues that many hip-hop artists have 
increasingly left singles or more playful tracks off their album to better 
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fit the standard set by Nas’s classic album. The trend, as Nosnitsky 
(2012) argues, is most visible in the career of Jay-Z: 
His consensus Serious Rap Classics—Reasonable Doubt and The Blueprint—are 
definite classics-by-design, all relatively sensitive and somber and focused and 
‘honest’, but they figure strangely into his catalog. Jay's a more adaptable rapper 
than Nas, so this sort of singularity doesn't necessarily suit him best. Certainly 
not from a commercial perspective—well-received but scattershot and single-
oriented affairs like Vol. 3 [...] Life and Times of S. Carter or The Blueprint 3 
have had far greater [commercial] success than his canonical classics. 
The trend is also visible in repeated attempts by hip-hop artists to 
create classic albums by collaborating with one (or a few) producers to 
produce a cohesive album, rather than relying on a wide variety of 
producers and sounds, the more common approach. 
That mold, if you like, fits certain artists better than others. To some 
it will feel like a constraint, and that is the effect of Illmatic that 
Nosnitsky emphasizes. There is another effect, however, because 
exemplars also help shape the production of future albums. In other 
words they enable as well as constrain artists wanting to make a 
(classic) hip-hop album. These constraints and possibilities are never 
absolute. Nosnitsky might be somewhat exaggerating the power of 
Illmatic as an exemplar, for no art (or entertainment) form is 
completely dominated by just one exemplar. Competing exemplars in 
hip-hop emerged regionally as for example in the albums of Dr. Dre 
which came to define the West-Coast sound and The Geto Boys, 
Outkast and UGK whose work would set the standard for the 
southern hip-hop sound. One could also think of the more recent 
singles-dominated albums by 50 Cent and Eminem, which maintained 
a balance between commercial success and critical acclaim. In that 
sense Kendrick Lamar’s album, despite being from the West Coast, is 
indeed best compared with the example set by Nas. It shares the 
musical cohesiveness, the serious introspective content, and a lack of 
crossover singles with Nas’s exemplary album. 
Admittedly this study relies heavily on the analysis of one insightful 
critic, but from the considerations it nonetheless becomes clear what a 
qualitative study of exemplars might entail and the insights into the 
reception as well as the production of new products it might generate. 
The story of the emergence of Illmatic as a classic hip-hop album that 
comes to shape future productions also bears striking similarities with 
the emergence of the biopic genre in film, as described insightfully by 
Rick Altman (1999: 44). He demonstrates how a particular 
interpretation of a film, shaped by the reinterpretation of the exemplar 
after the release of subsequent films, comes to shape what a specific 
type of film is supposed to look like. Retrospectively this is called the 
biopic, but at the time of the initial success, it is far from clear, as 
Altman shows, what qualities of the film created its success. This line 
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of reasoning is further corroborated by some of White’s case studies 
(White 2002; see especially his discussion of Scottish knitwear). 
Discussion: S tudying Exemplars in Markets 
In this article we have argued that exemplary goods are an important, 
yet overlooked, judgment device on markets. The paper offers a way to 
conceptualize exemplary goods, and demonstrates how the concept 
can be empirically operationalized to provide insight into the way in 
which meaning is coordinated on markets. The particular strength of 
exemplary goods as judgment devices lies in the way they are able to 
negotiate the tension between the general and the specific. Exemplars 
are particular goods, but they are interpreted to possess a combination 
of qualities which teaches us something about the desired qualities of a 
certain type of good. Other goods, perceived to be of the same type, 
are in turn compared, related and contrasted to these exemplary 
goods, which can be thought of as focal points for coordination on 
meaning and quality. 
The illustrative case studies have highlighted important aspects of 
the use of exemplars. First, they demonstrate the coordination process 
in which current goods are positioned in relation to existing goods. 
Second, they demonstrate how the use of exemplars is important in 
advertising and critical discussion in the mediating process between 
consumers and producers. The case study of the marketing of books 
highlights how exemplars shape the expectations of consumers, and 
act as focal points in the communication between producer and 
consumer. The case study of the rap album demonstrates that 
particular important exemplars might significantly shape relevant 
notions of quality on a market or genre, and might hence influence the 
nature of later production. It also highlights the important mediating 
role of critics who interpret exemplars. 
The case studies highlight moreover that the process of qualification 
and rating which has been made central in the valuation process of 
singular goods by Karpik and others misses important aspects. The use 
of exemplars does not rely on general categories or uniform ratings, 
but rather on the comparison of particulars. It does not rely on 
qualification within general categories, but rather on association or 
dissociation of particular goods. Exemplars moreover allow for a 
multiplicity of qualities in the valuation of singular goods, and do not 
rely on a single standard in the way that ratings do. 
This article has not dealt with the way in which certain goods 
become exemplars, a question of great importance. It has simply 
assumed that there exist several or just one exemplary goods within a 
market. To develop the notion of exemplars further this should 
definitely be explored. Once certain goods are identified as exemplary 
they might shape the way in which markets develop, and create a 
certain path-dependency. 
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The most important aspect economically is undoubtedly the study 
of how exemplars coexist and compete. That competition is a 
multifaceted process. Current incumbents might benefit from an 
intimate knowledge of the existing exemplars and how to interpret 
these. New entrants might be seeking to “break the mold” and attempt 
to establish alternative exemplars. Various exemplars however can 
exist next to one another, and shape the overall market structure or 
particular niche markets, as the illustrative case of the book series 
suggests. 
Sociologically we might be interested in the way in which different 
intermediaries have the power to select and interpret the qualities of 
exemplary goods. Intermediaries as well as institutional and state 
actors might have power to select exemplary goods, or to (re)interpret 
exemplary goods in a particular way. But hopefully such concerns will 
not be separated from each other along older disciplinary lines, 
because they are all part of the way in which products are valued, and 
priced on markets. 
Acknowledgments. I would like to thank the contributors to the Econ 
& Culture seminar at the Eramus University of Rotterdam and two 
anonymous reviewers for their valuable suggestions; I am to blame for 
any error that remains. 
References 
Altman, Rick. 1999. Film/Genre. London: British Film Institute. 
Arendt, Hannah. 1982. Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy. Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Barsalou, Lawrence W. 1985. “Ideals, Central Tendency, and Frequency of 
Instantiation as Determinants of Graded Structure in Categories.” Journal 
of Experimental Psychology 11(4): 629–654. 
Beckert, Jens. 2012. “The ‘Social Order of Markets’ Approach: A Reply to 
Kurtulus Gemici.” Theory and Society 41(1): 119–125, DOI 10.1007/
s11186-011-9160-6. 
Beckert, Jens, and Christine Musselin. 2013. Constructing Quality: The 
Classification of Goods in Markets. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
DOI 10.1017/CBO9781107415324.004. 
Burnett, Russell C., Douglas L. Medin, Norbert O. Ross, and Sergey V. Blok. 
2005. “Ideal Is Typical.” Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology 
59(1): 3–10. 
Callon, Michel, Cécile Méadel, and Vololona Rabeharisoa. 2002. “The 
Economy of Qualities.” Economy and Society 31(2): 194–217. 
  Valuation Studies 122
Carroll, Glenn R., and Anand Swaminathan. 2000. “Why the Microbrewery 
Movement? Organizational Dynamics of Resource Partitioning in the 
U.S. Brewing Industry.” American Journal of Sociology 106(3): 715–762. 
Caves, Richard. 2000. Creative Industries: Contracts between Art and 
Commerce. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Danko, Dagmar. 2008. “Nathalie Heinich’s Sociology of Art ‒ and Sociology 
from Art.” Cultural Sociology 2: 242–256, DOI 10.1177/ 
1749975508091035. 
DiMaggio, Paul. 1987. “Classification in Art.” American Sociological Review 
52(4): 440–455. 
Earl, Peter E., and Jason Potts. 2013. “The Creative Instability Hypothesis.” 
Journal of Cultural Economics 37(2): 153–173. 
Eymard-Duvernay, François, Olivier Favereau, André Orléan, Robert Salais, 
and Laurent Thévenot. 2005. “Pluralist Integration in the Economic and 
Social Sciences: The Economy of Conventions.” Post-Autistic Economics 
Review 34: 22–40. 
Hayek, Friedrich A. 1937. “Economics and Knowledge.” Economica 4(13): 
33–54. 
———. 1945. “The Use of Knowledge in Society.” The American Economic 
Review 35(4): 519–530. 
———. 1948. “The Meaning of Competition.” In Individualism and 
Economic Order, 92–106. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Heinich, Nathalie. 2005. L’élite artiste. Excellence et singularité en régime 
démocratique. Paris: Editions Gallimard. 
Hutter, Michael. 2011. “Infinite Surprises: On the Stabilization of Value in 
the Creative Industries.” In The Worth of Goods, edited by Jens Beckert 
and Patrik Aspers, 201–222. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Jones, Candace, Massimo Maoret, Felipe G. Massa, and Silviya Svejenova. 
2012. “Rebels with a Cause: Formation, Contestation, and Expansion of 
the De Novo Category ‘Modern Architecture,’ 1870-1975.” Organization 
Science 23(6): 1523–1545, DOI 10.1287/orsc.1110.0701. 
Karpik, Lucien. 2010. Valuing the Unique: The Economics of Singularities. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Kjellberg, Hans, Alexandre Mallard, Diane-Laure Arjaliès, Patrik Aspers, 
Stefan Beljean, Alexandra Bidet, Alberto Corsin, Emmanuel Didier, 
Marion Fourcade, Susi Geiger, Klaus Hoeyer, Michèle Lamont, Donald 
MacKenzie, Bill Maurer, Jan Mouritsen, Ebba Sjögren, Kjell Tryggestad, 
François Vatin, and Steve Woolgar. 2013. “Valuation Studies? Our 
Collective Two Cents.” Valuation Studies 1 (1): 51–81, DOI 10.3384/vs.
2001-5992.13111. 
Kopytoff, Igor. 1986. “The Cultural Biography of Things: Commoditization 
as a Process.” In The Social Life of Things, edited by Arjun Appadurai, 
64–91. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Kuhn, Thomas S. 1970. “Postscript.” In The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions, 2nd ed. 174–210. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Exemplary Goods        123
Levy, Thierry. 2002. “The Theory of Conventions and a New Theory of the 
Firm.” In Intersubjectivity in Economics: Agents and Structures, edited by 
Edward Fullbrook, 254–272. London: Routledge. 
Lynch, Elizabeth B., John D. Coley, and Douglas L. Medin. 2000. “Tall Is 
Typical: Central Tendency, Ideal Dimensions, and Graded Category 
Structure among Tree Experts and Novices.” Memory & Cognition 28(1): 
41–50. 
Mervis, Carolyn B. and Eleanor Rosch. 1981. “Categorization of Natural 
Objects.” Annual Review of Psychology 32: 89–115. 
Musselin, Christine, and Catherine Paradeise. 2005. “Quality: A Debate.” 
Sociologie Du Travail 47: 89–123, DOI 10.1016/j.soctra.2005.09.002. 
Navis, Chad, and Mary Ann Glynn. 2010. “How New Market Categories 
Emerge: Temporal Dynamics of Legitimacy, Identity, and Entrepreneur-
ship in Satellite Radio 1990-2005.” Administrative Science Quarterly 
55(3): 439–471. 
Nosnitsky, Andrew. 2012. “Classic Material.” Pitchfork, http://pitchfork.com/
features/hall-of-game/8997-classic-material/, accessed  June 8, 2016. 
Rosa, José Antonio, Joseph F. Porac, Jelena Runser-Spanjol, and Michael S. 
Saxon. 1999. “Sociocognitive Dynamics in a Product Market.” Journal of 
Marketing 63: 64–77. 
Rosch, Eleanor. 1978. “Principles of Categorization.” In Cognition and 
Categorization, edited by Eleanor Rosch and Barbara B. Lloyd, 27–48. 
Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Rosch, Eleanor, and Carolyn B. Mervis. 1975. “Family Resemblances: Studies 
in the Internal Structure of Categories.” Cognitive Pscyhology 7: 573–
605. 
Schelling, Thomas C. 1960. The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
Smith, Barbara Herrnstein. 1983. “Contingencies of Value.” Critical Inquiry 
10(1): 1–35. 
Sugden, Robert. 1995. “A Theory of Focal Points.” The Economic Journal 
105(430): 533–550. 
Weber, Max. 1904 [1949]. The Methodology of the Social Sciences, edited by 
Edward A. Shills and Henry A. Finch. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press. 
White, Harrison C. 2002. Markets from Networks: Socioeconomic Models of 
Production. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Wilson, Elliott. 2012. “Believe the Kendrick Lamar Hype?” Life and Times, 
http://lifeandtimes.com/believe-the-kendrick-lamar-hype, accessed June 8, 
2016. 
Zuckerman, Ezra W. 1999. “The Categorical Imperative: Securities Analysts 
and the Illegitimacy Discount.” American Journal of Sociology 104(5): 
1398–1438. 
  Valuation Studies 124
Erwin Dekker is assistant professor in cultural economics at the 
Erasmus University in Rotterdam, and post-doctoral fellow at the 
George Mason University Department of Economics. He has recently 
published The Viennese Students of Civilization with Cambridge 
University Press. His research focuses on every area where art and 
culture meet economics. He has published in the fields of cultural 
economics, economic methodology and intellectual history, and he is 
currently working on exemplary goods and moral frameworks. 
Previously he has worked as lecturer at the European Studies 
department at the University of Amsterdam, where he specialized in 
political economy. 
